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Abstract 
 Th e doctrine of election lies at the heart of Reformed theology. Th is essay oﬀers a review of 
Matthias Gockel’s recent comparison between two of Reformed theology’s greatest voices: that of 
Friedrich Schleiermacher and Karl Barth. Gockel outlines Schleiermacher’s contribution to the 
doctrine before turning to consider its modiﬁcations in Barth’s work. Th e advance of these two 
thinkers on this issue has signiﬁcant implications for the ongoing questions of universal election 
and universal salvation. Consequently, the possibility of an apokatastasis panton arises naturally 
from their theology. Th is possibility is brieﬂy explored. 
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 Karl Barth’s scolding criticisms of Friedrich Schleiermacher are no secret, 
and no short mileage has been made by theologians on the apparent division 
between the two theologians. In Matthias Gockel’s latest oﬀering (a revised 
version of his 2002 doctoral dissertation completed at Princeton under Bruce 
McCormack), he joins Robert Sherman and others in enriching, with renewed 
sophistication, our understanding of the relationship between Barth and Sch-
leiermacher, challenging traditional evaluations that ‘liberal theology’ and ‘dia-
lectical theology’ stand in irreconcilable opposition. 
 Rather than attempt to cover a multidimensional canvas with broad strokes, 
Gockel restricts his inquiry to an incisive and cogent comparison of the devel-
opment of the doctrine of election in the two thinkers. Without proposing 
any theory of historical dependence, Gockel contends that the divergence 
between these two commanding Reformed theologians does not stem from 
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irreconcilable starting points, but rather from the indispensability of God’s 
grace. Gockel convincingly argues that “Barth’s theology is not just a repudia-
tion of Schleiermacher but an expansion of his predecessor’s work in a new 
framework.”1 He also shows us that while the Swiss theologian’s evaluation of 
‘the father of modern theology’ is “sometimes negative, sometimes positive 
and often ambiguous,”2 Barth was not always a reliable interpreter of his own 
thought, nor always consistent in his criticisms of others. 
 Schleiermacher and the Single Divine Will 
 Gockel’s thesis is that the doctrine of election in Barth’s early theology bears 
a close resemblance to Schleiermacher’s own theo-centric position. Barth’s the-
ology, however, from 1936 onwards, undergoes a radical Christological revi-
sioning of his earlier position. Gockel begins his survey and assessment of 
Schleiermacher by turning to Schleiermacher’s revision of the doctrine in his 
1819 essay, “On the Doctrine of Election.”3 Gockel helpfully, albeit brieﬂy, 
situates Schleiermacher’s early contribution on election in the context of the 
ecclesiastical union between the Lutheran and Reformed churches in Prussia 
in 1817. Central to this union were the debates over the Lord’s Supper and 
the doctrine of election. Th e crucial point over the latter concerned “the indis-
pensability of divine grace for . . . conversion and the question whether human 
beings can accept or resist God’s grace by their own free choice.”4 Schleierma-
cher’s most creative contribution to the discussion was his notion of an undi-
vided and unconditional “single divine will and decree which eﬀects [both] 
faith and unbelief.”5 He argues that the older paradigm of a twofold divine 
will of election and reprobation is “as meaningless as the question why God 
made human beings in the way they were made.”6 Th e elect, Schleiermacher 
contends, are those who are “regenerated and begin their religious self-
development.”7 Although the remainder of persons are for now spiritually 
1  Matthias Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher on the Doctrine of Election: A Systematic-
Th eological Comparison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 13. Subsequent page references 
to this book will be in the main text. 
2  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 9. 
3  An earlier version of this chapter appeared as Matthias Gockel, “New Perspectives on an 
Old Debate: Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Essay on Election,” International Journal of Systematic 
Th eology 6, no. 3 (2004), 301-18. 
4  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 18.
5  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 26. 
6  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 29. 
7  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 30. 
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dead and “not yet members of the kingdom of God,”8 they are included in 
God’s love and so “they never lose the ability to be revived.”9 Gockel notes that 
the notion of the single decree “emphasises the unity of the divine attributes 
and helps to clarify key issues not only in the debate over election but also in 
the doctrine of God.”10  
 Schleiermacher’s revision of the doctrine of election, articulated in the 1819 
essay, is more fully developed in his Der christliche Glaube (1821-22) within 
the bounds of a single divine decree of universal predestination to salvation 
in Christ, and systematically located in ecclesiology. Gockel notes that the 
starting-point of the discussion of election, for Schleiermacher, is the “dilemma 
that arises from the simultaneous existence of believers and non-believers, on 
the one hand, and the benevolent divine will towards all human beings in 
Christ’s redemptive work, on the other hand.”11 Schleiermacher’s response is 
to insist that the “divine will is identical with the work of redemption in and 
through the person of Christ.”12  
 Schleiermacher rejects any idea of two, separate, foreordained groups of per-
sons—a double-predestination—and the notion that one group might be eter-
nally excluded from the beneﬁts of Christ’s work. Such ideas, he maintains, 
betray the general character of redemption and the universal mission of the 
church. God has one will, and that will is identical with who God is, and what 
God does in Jesus Christ. Humanity—believers and unbelievers alike—are the 
object of God’s predestinating will of salvation in Christ. Despite the tempo-
rary reprobation of some, “God sees all human beings, not only the believers, 
in Christ.”13 In light of this reality, the church is called to live, order its life after, 
and bear universal witness to the divine decision. 
 Gockel concludes his examination of Schleiermacher by noting that despite 
Schleiermacher’s Christologically motivated aﬃrmation of general redemption 
and rejection of eternal reprobation, his overall construction remains theocen-
tric: “it is grounded in the belief in God the almighty creator, even though 
ecclesiology is its context and christology its background.”14  
 8  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 34. 
 9  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 30. 
10  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 34. 
11  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 101. 
12  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 100. 
13  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 102. 
14  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 103. 
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 Barth’s Early Revision of the Doctrine of Election in his Der Römerbrief 
 In his Der Römerbrief, Barth raises two objections against the Augustinian for-
mulation, which he regards as “a ‘mythologizing’ construction.”15 First, Barth 
rejects the notion that predestination can be explained in terms of cause and 
eﬀect. While the human act of faith happens within a familiar historical con-
text, its origin always lies with God: “Th e act of faith does not occur when a 
human being has recognized God but when God has recognized a human 
being.”16 Barth’s point: “God wants to be known through God.”17 Second, 
Barth discards the attribution of election and reprobation to “predetermined 
quantities of individual persons, since this neglects that God’s eternal predes-
tination is related to humankind as a whole and is not a one-time event but 
occurs time and again in history when a human being is addressed by God’s 
Word.”18 Th e driving issue here for Barth, as in his whole doctrine of election, 
is the divine freedom. 
 For Barth, the key verse for understanding Romans, and Christian theol-
ogy, in general, is Romans 11:32, “God enclosed everyone in disobedience, in 
order to show mercy on everyone.” Th is verse aﬃrms that the content of God’s 
predestination is God’s unconditional mercy. More radically, Barth contends 
that Paul’s claim suggests a modiﬁcation—though not a rejection—of the notion 
of double predestination. Double predestination does not require rejection so 
long as we are clear that it refers to a movement, to the “teleology by which 
God’s salviﬁc act is directed, namely, from reprobation to election.”19 For Barth, 
reprobation is never the goal. “God’s Yes shines even into the last depth of His 
No, precisely because the latter is so radical, because it is the divine No.”20 
Reprobation exists therefore “only as the shadow of the light of election.”21  
 Gockel contends that there is a distinct echo of Schleiermacher’s doctrine 
of election in Barth’s own early revision of the doctrine. In Der Römerbrief, 
Barth accentuates the dialectical unity of God’s decree: “God’s reprobation (of 
the elect) and God’s election (of the reprobate) are ‘unintuitably one and the 
same in God.’ ”22 Gockel identiﬁes two central aspects concerning the relation 
15  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 108. 
16  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 108. 
17  Karl Barth, Der Römerbrief 1922 (Zollikon-Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1954), 384. Gockel 
works primarily from Barth’s 1922 edition where Barth’s treatment of election is more extensive. 
18  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 109. 
19  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 113. 
20  Barth, Römerbrief 1922, 387. 
21  Barth, Römerbrief 1922, 386. 
22  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 118. 
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between reprobation and election for Barth. First, the possibility of reproba-
tion is overcome eternally in God. Adam’s old world really is surpassed by 
Christ’s new world. Second, the individual outcome of the two-fold possibility 
of unbelief and belief is not determined by God before time; but rather, in 
the freedom of God is the event in which God addresses the creature in time. 
Th e content or purpose of such an address is qualiﬁed by the “turn from rep-
robation to election” in God, which expresses the one eternal will of God for 
humanity.23 Any duality here of judgement and grace is the duality of God’s 
uniﬁed action, an action which aﬀects all human beings alike, and is deter-
mined by God’s redemptive will revealed in Christ’s death and resurrection. 
Th e church and the world, therefore, “stand under the same promise and the 
same judgment [which] makes it impossible to conceive them as two separate 
groups of persons.”24 Even as early as his Romans commentary, Barth main-
tained a hopeful universalism grounded in the freedom and love of God lead-
ing to the priority of election over reprobation: “reprobation has been overcome 
and absorbed by election.”25 Christ’s work “entails the hope that the duality 
between faith and history does not preclude the possibility of an eventual 
restoration of humankind and a return ‘into the unity with God, which is now 
and here completely lost.’ ”26 Barth’s emphasis here is that the original unity 
of God and humanity (a notion abandoned in the Göttingen lectures) is not 
superseded by judgement. Judgement, rather, is practical, leading to a re-union 
of human and divine righteousness. 
 Gockel observes that the relationship between the historical appearance of 
Jesus Christ and the determination of God’s will remains unclear in Barth’s 
theology, and his emphasis on the original unity leads to similar problems to 
Schleiermacher’s notion of absolute dependence. Furthermore, when Barth 
“asserts that God’s will is revealed in Jesus Christ who personiﬁes God’s uni-
versal faithfulness and righteousness, it remains unclear how the eternal his-
tory between God and humankind is related to the history of Jesus Christ.”27 
23  Barth, Römerbrief, 333. 
24  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 125. 
25  Barth, Römerbrief, 402. 
26  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 130. 
27  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 131. 
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 Barth’s Development of the Revision in the Göttingen Lectures 
 Barth’s revision of the Reformed doctrine of election is developed further in the 
so-called Göttingen Dogmatics, where he punctuates the teleological ordering of 
election and reprobation. Th e real purpose of God’s predestinating act is always 
election, even in rejection. While the reprobation is real as the shadow side 
of election, it is never God’s ﬁnal word. God’s ﬁnal word is Jesus Christ and in 
him every promise of God ﬁnds its ‘Yes’ (2 Cor. 1:18-20). “Rejection does not 
take place for its own sake but in revelation of the righteousness of God in 
order that God’s mercy might be manifested in his election, and in order that 
in it all, though in this irreversible order, God himself might be known and 
praised.”28 God’s judgement is never divorced from God’s grace and can never 
be recognized apart from “the cross, the judgment, the condemnation in which 
we stand”; the way of predestination therefore leads us “by way of condemna-
tion—indeed, by the way of hell itself—to salvation and life.”29 We will return 
to this below in the discussion of Barth’s Church Dogmatics II/2. 
 Gockel concludes his discussion of Barth’s Göttingen work by surmising that 
Barth’s doctrine of election “becomes more actualistic and less speculative, 
while still not christocentric.” He adds, “Barth stops short of eschatological 
universalism, and his consistent emphasis on God’s freedom as well as the asser-
tion that ‘all are at every moment under the divine Either—Or’ should be taken 
seriously.”30  
 Th e picture that Gockel paints is that in both the Römerbrief and the Göt-
tingen Dogmatics, Barth has developed a Schleiermacherian reconstruction of 
the doctrine of election by means of the idea of a single divine decree towards 
life. Although Schleiermacher understands the Creator-creature relationship 
diﬀerently from Barth, they both hold that the single divine decree is to be 
understood in the context of the historical decision between faith and unbe-
lief. For both of them (at this point), the doctrine of election remains funda-
mentally theocentric and universal, with a focus on the graced-initiative of the 
divine act which involves a teleological movement in time from reprobation to 
election, the former serving the latter, and the latter qualifying the former. 
Above all, the focus for both theologians is on “the predestining God” rather 
than “individual predestined human beings.”31  
28  Karl Barth, Th e Göttingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion trans. Geoﬀrey W. 
Bromiley; Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 460. 
29  Barth, Göttingen Dogmatics, 471. 
30  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 155. 
31  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 157. 
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 Barth’s Second Modiﬁcation of the Doctrine of Election 
 In his ﬁfth chapter, entitled “Barth’s Christological Revolution,” Gockel turns 
brieﬂy to Barth’s lectures of 1936 (given at two Reformed seminaries in Hun-
gary) and 1937 (Barth’s Giﬀord Lectures on the Scots Confession given at the 
University of Aberdeen), and more substantially to Barth’s Church Dogmatics 
II/2, where Barth developed his most radical proposal, modifying for a second 
time his doctrine of election. In the Christological revision undertaken in II/2, 
election no longer refers to the twofold possibility of faith and unbelief but to 
the double determination of individual human beings and God’s own being. 
Barth’s priority is that God sees every human being and also himself in Christ. 
 Here, Gockel is on the more traversed ground of Barth’s notion that Jesus 
Christ is both God’s elect himself and the foundation of humanity’s election.32 
Gockel argues that it was not until the 1936 lectures that Barth’s Christologi-
cal revisioning of the doctrine of election ﬁrst appears; that what happened for 
and to humanity at Golgotha and was revealed at Easter is our eternal election. 
It is also here that Barth identiﬁes the one will of God in double predestina-
tion with Jesus Christ, that is, with God’s own being. “Jesus Christ not only 
reveals but also constitutes God’s gracious choice as the self-determination to 
be God for His people and the determination of humankind to be the people 
of God.”33 Barth contends that God’s gracious choice is the divine decision 
made in Jesus Christ, the speculum electionis.34 It is in and through Jesus Christ 
that God has actualized his eternal covenant with humanity, God’s eternal 
election of himself to communion with humanity, and humanity to commun-
ion with God. Here Barth distinguishes himself from the disposition in some 
camps of the Reformed tradition of an insistence on the inscrutableness and 
invisibility of the divine decrees. In Jesus Christ—the electing God and the 
elected Man—God’s purposes in election are made manifest to all. Christ is, 
in Barth’s words, “the ﬁrst and last word to men of the faithfulness of God” 
32  Th e same point is made by Heppe. Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: Set Out and 
Illustrated from the Sources ed. Ernst Bizer; trans. G.T. Th ompson (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1950), 
168. Barth used Heppe’s Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche as the primary source 
for his Göttingen lectures. Heinrich Heppe, Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche, 
dargestellt und aus den Quellen belegt ed. Ernst Bizer (Neukirchen: Neukirchner Verlag, 1958). 
33  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 169. 
34  Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II.2 ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance; trans. G.W. 
Bromiley et al. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1957), 64. Here Barth echoes Calvin who insists that 
“Christ [is] . . . the mirror wherein we must, and without self-deception may, contemplate our 
own election.” John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill; trans. Ford 
Lewis Battles; 2 Vols. (Philadelphia: Th e Westminster Press, 1977), III.24.5. 
120 J. A. Goroncy / Journal of Reformed Th eology 2 (2008) 113-130
in election.35 Jesus Christ, therefore, is not merely the channel of God’s one 
decree, but its source. And he is not merely the one who elects, but he is also 
the one who elects himself to be the modus operandi by which others are 
elected. 
 Consequences of Barth’s Revision 
 Gockel turns to critically consider the consequences of Barth’s doctrine of 
election. He identiﬁes six key areas: (1) epistemological implications, (2) the 
concrete determination of predestination, (3) the issue of double predestina-
tion, (4) the actuality of predestination, (5) the question of universal election 
and universal salvation, and (6) the relation between Israel and the Christian 
church. I will focus here on (2), (3), (4), and (5). 
 Th e Concrete Determination of Predestination 
 Regarding the second area (i.e., on the concrete determination of predestina-
tion), while Barth never intended to drive a wedge between the economy and 
being of God, Gockel sides with McCormack over against Molnar that this 
very inconsistency arises within Barth’s own formulation of his doctrine of 
election: “Th e assumption of a divine will preceding the predestination puts 
into doubt whether the gracious choice really belongs to God’s ‘own eternal 
essence.’ ”36 Th e issue fundamentally concerns whether or not the works of 
God ad extra are the overﬂow of the works of God ad intra or whether the one 
eternal will of God is identical with Jesus Christ ensarkos. McCormack con-
tends that “election is an eternal decision and as such resists our attempts to 
temporalize it.” To do so, he argues, is to introduce into the being of God in 
pre-temporal eternity a ‘before’ and an ‘after.’ “If election is an eternal deci-
sion,” McCormack argues, “then it has never not taken place.”37 Molnar’s 
response is that such a move makes election a “necessity” and, consequently, 
“the very opposite of what Barth intended with his doctrine of the immanent 
35  Karl Barth, Th e Epistle to the Romans, trans. E.C. Hoskyns (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1968), 105. 
36  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 179. 
37  Bruce L. McCormack, “Grace and Being: Th e Role of God’s Gracious Election in Karl 
Barth’s Th eological Ontology,” in Th e Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth ed. John Webster 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 101. 
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Trinity.”38 Molnar’s reading of Barth’s proposal that God has one being, and 
that that one being subsists simultaneously in two diﬀ erent forms (the second 
dependent on the ﬁ rst), which are not separate but, rather, are a unity-in-
distinction and distinction-in-unity, is under-attended by Gockel. 
 Jesus the Reprobate—“Joyous News” 
 On the question of double predestination, Gockel rehearses Barth’s conviction 
that we must speak of Jesus Christ not only in reference to the positive side of 
election, but also in reference to the other side of God’s decree—reprobation. 
Here, as we shall see below, Barth sets himself apart from the tradition (or 
at least extends the tradition) and declares that both election and reprobation 
happen in Jesus Christ. Barth’s doctrine of reprobation is as Christological as 
his doctrine of election. He contends that the God who elected fellowship 
with humanity also elected our rejection. In electing our rejection, however, 
“He made it his own. He bore it and suﬀered it with all its most bitter conse-
quences.”39 Th us in the self-reprobation of Godself in Jesus Christ—the Man 
justiﬁed and the ‘Judge judged in our place’—humanity recognizes not only 
God’s ﬁnal ‘Yes’ but also its own reprobation. Th is self-giving is God’s free 
choice and entails God’s self-determination and the determination of humanity 
through a ‘wonderful exchange’ in Jesus Christ. “To believe in God’s predesti-
nation,” Gockel concludes, “means by deﬁnition to believe in the non-
reprobation of humankind.”40 As Barth notes, “in God’s eternal purpose” it 
is not humanity, but “God Himself who is rejected in His Son.”41 God’s self-
giving in Jesus Christ consists in the fact that he is rejected in our place: 
“Predestination means that from all eternity God has determined upon man’s 
acquittal at His own cost.”42 Gockel then raises the question and apparent 
38  Paul D. Molnar, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity: In Dialogue with 
Karl Barth and Contemporary Th eology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2002), 62. Th e important 
debate between McCormack’s and Molnar’s reading of Barth’s doctrine of election is beyond the 
scope of this essay. Th ose wishing to follow that discussion should consult McCormack’s essay 
“Grace and Being” and Molnar’s Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity. For 
more recent discussion, see Bruce L. McCormack, “Seek God where he may be found: a response 
to Edwin Chr. van Driel,” Scottish Journal of Th eology 60 (2007), 62-79; Paul D. Molnar, “Can 
the Electing God be God without us? Some Implications of Bruce McCormack’s Understanding 
of Barth’s Doctrine of Election for the Doctrine of the Trinity,” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische 
Th eologie und Religionsphilosophie 49, no. 2 (2007), 199-222. 
39  Barth, CD II/2, 164. 
40  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 181. 
41  Barth, CD II/2, 167. 
42  Barth, CD II/2, 167. 
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conﬂict concerning whether the claim that the Son of God instead of the 
Son of Man suﬀered God’s wrath contrasts with Barth’s earlier claim that “the 
elected human being Jesus is the target or ‘oﬀering’ of God’s wrath.” He notes 
Barth’s own awareness of and answer to this in II/1: “Only God Himself could 
bear God’s wrath. Only God’s mercy was capable of bearing the kind of 
suﬀering to which the creature existing in opposition to God is subject. Only 
God’s mercy could be touched by this suﬀering in such a way that it knew how 
to make it its own suﬀering. And only God’s mercy was strong enough not to 
perish in this suﬀering.”43 As if hell—that is, something of creation—could 
exhaust the awful shame and scandal of sin. 
 Barth’s concern in his treatment on election is that election should be good 
news—gospel—or, what Barth calls is another place, “joyous news.”44 Th us 
does Barth open his chapter on election in II/2: “Th e doctrine of election is 
the sum of the Gospel because of all words that can be said or heard it is the 
best; that God elects man; that God is for man too the One who loves in free-
dom . . . Its function is to bear basic testimony to eternal, free and unchanging 
grace as the beginning of all the ways and works of God.”45 Here Barth is 
following Calvin—and, according to Muller, the Reformed tradition more 
generally at least up until 1650—who repeatedly stressed that we look to 
Christ as the assurance of our election.46 Calvin is as adamant as Barth. Where 
Calvin—and the Reformed tradition—is silent, however, is about how the 
question of reprobation—the shadow side of election—also relates to Christ. 
Holmes has suggested that the weakness in Calvin’s account of predestination 
is not that election is separate from Christ (which it is not), but that “the doc-
trine of reprobation is detached, Christless and hidden in the unsearchable 
purposes of God. As such it bears no comparison with the doctrine of election, 
but remains something less than a Christian doctrine.”47 Holmes goes on to 
suggest that Calvin’s shortcoming is not that he reserved an equal stature—a 
43  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 183. 
44  Karl Barth, God Here and Now, trans. Paul M. van Buren (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1964), 29. 
45  Barth, CD II/2, 3. 
46  Richard A. Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Th eology 
from Calvin to Perkins (Durham: Labyrinth Press, 1986). I am grateful to Stephen Holmes for 
pointing me to Muller’s book. Stephen R. Holmes, Listening to the Past: Th e Place of Tradition in 
Th eology (Carlisle/Grand Rapids: Paternoster/Baker, 2002), 124-6. Holmes concludes his survey 
by stating that “the Reformed Orthodox doctrine of election simply cannot be accused of a 
failure to be Christological.” Holmes, Listening, 128. 
47  Holmes, Listening, 129. 
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double decree—to God’s ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ in election, but that he has “almost no 
room for the doctrine of reprobation in his account”; “the ‘No’ does not really 
enter his thinking,” thus leading to an asymmetry between the two decrees 
and so, as Holmes suggests, “fails to be gospel.”48 Th is contrasts with Barth’s 
Christological theology of reprobation. Holmes summarizes Barth’s position 
thus: 
 In willing to be gracious in the particular way God in fact wills to be gracious, the 
Incarnation of the Divine Son, there is both a ‘Yes’ and a ‘No’, election and reproba-
tion. God elects for humanity life, salvation, forgiveness, hope; for himself he elects 
death, perdition, even, as the Creed has said, hell. Th is self-reprobation of God is 
indeed the primary referent of the doctrine of election, in that God’s determination of 
himself is formally if not materially more basic than his determination of the creature, 
and so is considered ﬁrst by Barth. In the eternal election of grace, which is to say in 
Jesus Christ, God surrenders his own impassibility, embraces the darkness that he was 
without—and indeed impervious to—until he willed that it should be otherwise . . . 
Th e apostle put it more succinctly: “He became sin for us.” Th is is the full content of 
the divine judgement, of the ‘No’ that is spoken over the evil of the world and of 
human beings. God elects for himself the consequences of that ‘No’, in saying ‘Yes’ to, 
that is, in electing, us. Th at is the whole content of the double decree, the whole con-
tent of the ‘Yes’ and the ‘No’ that God pronounces as one word, the whole content the 
election of grace.49  
 Concerned that his own tradition had at this point replaced Jesus Christ with 
a decretum absolutum, Barth asked, “Is it a fact that there is no other basis of 
election outside Jesus Christ? Must the doctrine as such be related to this basis 
and this basis only?”50 Because of Jesus Christ, Barth was able to speak of God’s 
‘No’ as gospel also. 
 Th e Actuality of Predestination 
 On the actuality of predestination, Gockel questions how useful Barth’s gram-
mar regarding predestination as a present event is. He suggests that God’s 
“eternally preceding” decision is “the mystery of all historical events,”51 and 
that it does not have to imply a continuation of the decision itself within his-
tory, given God’s predestining election of Jesus Christ. Gockel helpfully sug-
gests that “a less actualistic view of predestination could more clearly emphasize 
48  Holmes, Listening, 130; cf. p. 134. 
49  Holmes, Listening, 132. 
50  Barth, CD II/2, 63. 
51  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 185. 
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the signiﬁcance of the historical appearance of Jesus Christ and thus dispel the 
impression that Barth tears apart the ‘eternal content’ and the ‘temporal form’ 
of election.”52  
 Universal Election and Universal Salvation 
 Brewing away throughout Gockel’s book, not infrequently rearing its head, is 
the question of universal election and universal salvation. Gockel contends 
that Barth’s Christological revision leads him to abandon his 1936 objection 
to universalism and aﬃrmation of an eschatological division between the elect 
and the reprobate. Barth now “joins Schleiermacher in leaving open the pos-
sibility of a ‘ﬁnal opening up and expansion of the circle of election and call-
ing’ which may include everyone.”53 Barth’s reluctance, however, to embrace 
universalism leads to some pointed challenges by Gockel. 
 Gockel notes that both Schleiermacher and Barth share a stance consistent 
with supralapsarianism’s claim that the decree of predestination precedes that 
of creation and fall, although they both go further in their assertion that God’s 
mercy is the decisive criterion not of redemption only but also of predestina-
tion. Gockel argues that despite Barth’s “own explicit unwillingness to go that 
far,” that is, to embrace a universal predestination to salvation, his aﬃrmation 
of universal election “implies some form of universal salvation.”54  
 Gockel also contends that Barth’s appeal to God’s freedom is, at this point, 
inconsistent with Barth’s own position regarding God’s self-determination to 
be Immanuel in Jesus Christ. Gockel notes that Barth’s (and Schleiermacher’s) 
caution on the issue can be partly explained by the fact that “any aﬃrmation 
of universalism would have meant the endorsement of an ecumenical heresy, 
which could have cost him dearly.”55 However, the question remains: How can 
that which has already been overcome in Jesus Christ ever be undone? How 
can this impossible possibility remain? Gockel suggests that Schleiermacher is 
at least more consistent here with his emphasis on the unity of God’s will. 
With all of Barth’s massively powerful Christological revisioning, he, accord-
ing to Gockel, “shied away from certain far-ranging implications.”56 “One 
should ask,” Gockel suggests, “whether a consistent theory of an Apokatastasis, 
far from presenting a danger or even a threat, might not be a more satisfying 
52  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 185. 
53  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 188. 
54  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 189. 
55  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 208. 
56  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 205. 
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option than the claim that the New Testament leaves us with a paradoxical 
constellation of the ‘universalism of the divine salviﬁc will’ versus the ‘particu-
larism of judgment.’ ”57  
 Th e Hope for an apokatastasis panton 
 Many commentators have suggested that Barth’s reluctance to embrace with 
certainty an apokatastasis panton, even while holding out hope for such recon-
ciliation is compelling. Barth insists that God’s grace is characterized by God’s 
freedom. Th is means not only that we must never impose limits on the scope 
of grace, but also that we must never impose an universalist ‘system’ on grace 
either. To embrace either option would be to compromise the freedom of 
grace, and also to presume that we can deﬁne the precise scope of God’s grace. 
Th at is why Barth’s theology of grace incorporates a dialectical protest: he 
protests both against a system of universalism and against a denial of universal-
ism.58 Th e essential point, for Barth, is that God’s grace is completely free; that 
when God acts in grace it is none other than God himself who acts in free-
dom. When God comes to us in his grace, therefore, we can be certain that no 
third party or shadowy motive is twisting his arm. Because of this divine free-
dom and because of the nature of divine grace as grace, we can neither deny 
nor aﬃrm, therefore, the possibility of universal salvation. We stand to confess 
with Abraham, “Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?”59 Barth writes: 
 Th e proclamation of the Church must make allowance for this freedom of grace. Apo-
katastasis Panton? No, for a grace which automatically would ultimately have to 
embrace each and every one would certainly not be free grace. It surely would not be 
God’s grace. But would it be God’s free grace if we could absolutely deny that it could 
do that? Has Christ been sacriﬁced only for our sins? Has He not, according to 1 John 
2:2, been sacriﬁced for the whole world? . . . [Th us] the freedom of grace is preserved 
on both these sides . . . Even in the midst of hell, grace would still be grace, and even 
in the midst of hell it would have to be honored and praised and therefore announced 
to the other inhabitants of hell. It is not free for nothing, but it is also not grace for 
nothing. We should certainly not know it if we were of the opinion that we could stop 
short of announcing it.60  
57  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 208. 
58  See Oliver Crisp, “On Barth’s Denial of Universalism,” Th emelios 29 (2003), 18-29. 
59  Gen. 18:25. 
60  Barth, God Here and Now, 34, 35. Th e implications of Barth’s doctrine expressed in this 
book are teased out by Berkouwer who maintains that Barth stands at the very “threshold of the 
apokatastasis” but turns away because of “the freedom, the gift of grace.” It is thus “gift-character 
of grace” which is undermined by universalism: “Th e error of universalism does not lie in glorying 
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 It is diﬃcult to imagine a more solid basis for an apokatastasis panton than 
Barth provides in his doctrine of election and reprobation. But does Barth’s 
commitment to divine freedom contradict the center of his Christological revi-
sion? Does he ultimately lead us all to a country and then not promise us that 
we might enter? Gockel, following Janowski, suggests he does, and that the 
payment for such a commitment threatens to “tear open again, though in a 
modiﬁed way, the abyss of the decretum absolutum et horribile”61 —as though 
God’s Word towards a person might be diﬀerent from that which he has spo-
ken in Jesus Christ. 
 While Gockel notes Barth’s denial of an ultimate apokatastasis panton, he 
joins a pantheon of critiques—sympathetic and otherwise—who see an incon-
sistency in Barth here. Consider, for example, the critique from Bromiley. As 
one of the editors and principal translators of Barth’s work, few are more 
familiar with Barth’s corpus and theology than Bromiley. Citing IV/3, § 70.2, 
Bromiley synopsises Barth view: “Th e lie cannot overthrow the truth, but God 
may ﬁnally condemn the liar to live in it.”62 Bromiley observes in Barth a 
“trend toward an ultimate universalism” although acknowledges that, for Barth, 
“universalism in the sense of the salvation of all individuals is not a necessary 
implicate of Barth’s Christological universalism.”63 He suggests that Barth’s 
reservation here is “not really adequate.”64 Gockel identiﬁes the same incon-
sistency in Barth, a holding back of the full consequences of Barth’s Christol-
ogy. Again, Bromiley notes, “God’s manifest purpose in Christ is to save, but 
under the sovereignty of the Spirit some might not be saved. Th e question is 
whether the Christological reference ﬁnally helps or matters very much. Is not 
the ultimate decision still taken apart from the revealed election—that is, not 
in the prior counsel of the Father but in the inscrutable operation of the Spirit? 
In other words, the decision regarding individuals is simply removed from the 
inscrutability of sovereign predetermination to the inscrutability of sovereign 
calling.”65  
in God’s grace, but in integrating grace into a system of conclusions which is in conﬂict with 
grace as a sovereign gift.” Gerrit C. Berkouwer, Th e Triumph of Grace in the Th eology of Karl 
Barth, trans. Harry R. Boer (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), 362. 
61  Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher, 210. 
62  Geoﬀrey W. Bromiley, “Karl Barth,” in Creative Minds in Contemporary Th eology, ed. Philip 
Edgcumbe Hughes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), 49. 
63  Bromiley, “Karl Barth,” 54. 
64  Bromiley, “Karl Barth,” 54. 
65  Bromiley, “Karl Barth,” 53. 
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 Th e only two tenable positions available for the soteriological question are 
either (i) a robust reaﬃrmation of limited atonement (the negative side of 
which includes the possibility of annihilation), or (ii) some form of Christo-
logical universalism (with varying degress of dogmaticism). Barth, of course, 
was correctly suspicious of ‘isms,’ whether universalism or any other -ism, and 
would not aﬃrm a dogmatic doctrine of universal salvation, although he does 
join a tradition of both Eastern and Western theologians going back to Origen 
of Alexandria (185-232), Clement of Alexandria (d. 215), Gregory of Nyssa 
(335-394?), Ambrose of Milan (337?-397) and Gregory of Nazianzus (329-
389) who all aﬃrm a strong hope in universal salvation. Barth famously con-
cludes IV/3/1 by again urging that we have no good reason why we should be 
forbidden, or forbid ourselves from an “openness to the possibility that in the 
reality of God and man in Jesus Christ there is contained much more than we 
might expect,” including the “unexpected withdrawal of that ﬁnal threat.”66 
Barth continues: 
 If for a moment we accept the unfalsiﬁed truth of the reality which even now so force-
fully limits the perverted human situation, does it not point plainly in the direction of 
the work of a truly eternal divine patience and deliverance and therefore of an apoka-
tastasis or universal reconciliation? If we are certainly forbidden to count on this as 
though we had a claim to it, as though it were not supremely the work of God to 
which man can have no possible claim, we are surely commanded the more deﬁnitely 
to hope and pray for it as we may do already on this side of this ﬁnal possibility, i.e., 
to hope and pray cautiously and yet distinctly that, in spite of everything which may 
seem quite conclusively to proclaim the opposite, His compassion should not fail, and 
that in accordance with His mercy which is ‘new every morning’ He ‘will not cast oﬀ 
for ever’ (La. 3:22f., 31).67  
 Th e creature cannot impose anything upon God because God is sovereign and 
free. Th at is why universalism, Barth pressed, equals the elimination of God’s 
freedom. But if God in his sovereignty and freedom has revealed himself in his 
being-in-act—that is, in Jesus Christ—then ought this not have radical impli-
cations for all doctrinal issues, and no less this one. One such implication is 
that it cannot be presumed that God in his total freedom will act other than 
he has acted in Jesus Christ—full of grace and truth. 
66  Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV.3.1, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance; trans. G.W. 
Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 477-8. 
67  Barth, CD IV/3/1, 478. 
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 Th erefore, we may reasonably hope for a full apokatastasis. Few have expressed 
this hope more boldly than the nineteenth-century Congregationalist minister 
James Baldwin Brown: “Th e love which won the sceptre on Calvary will wield 
it as a power, waxing ever, waning never, through all the ages; and that the 
Father will never cease from yearning over the prodigals, and Christ will never 
cease from seeking the lost, while one knee remains stubborn before the name 
of Jesus, and one heart is unmastered by His love.”68 Or consider these words 
from Th omas Erskine: 
 I cannot believe that any human being can be beyond the reach of God’s grace and the 
sanctifying power of His Spirit. And if all are within His reach, is it possible to suppose 
that He will allow any to remain unsanctiﬁed? Is not the love revealed in Jesus Christ 
a love unlimited, unbounded, which will not leave undone anything which love could 
desire? It was surely nothing else than the complete and universal triumph of that love 
which Paul was contemplating when he cried out, ‘Oh the depth of the riches both of 
the wisdom and knowledge of God!’69  
 In Jesus Christ, the Triune God has bound humanity to himself in such a way 
that even if we refuse him and damn ourselves to hell, God in his love will 
never cease hunting us down. So even if the church cannot aﬃrm dogmati-
cally the apokatastasis panton, we can hope for it, pray for it, and stop denying 
the possibility of it in the grace of God. As von Balthasar asserts, there is all the 
diﬀerence in the world between believing in the certitude of universal salva-
tion and hoping for it.70  
 In answering the question, ‘Will, then, all people be saved in the end?’, 
Braaten reminds us that “We do not already know the answer. Th e ﬁnal answer 
is stored up in the mystery of God’s own future. All he has let us know in 
advance is that he will judge the world according to the measure of his grace 
and love made known in Jesus Christ, which is ultimately greater than the 
ﬁerceness of his wrath or the hideousness of our sin.”71 So Barth noted in Th e 
Humanity of God: “Th is much is certain, that we have no theological right to 
set any sort of limits to the loving-kindness of God which has appeared in Jesus 
68  James Baldwin Brown, Th e Doctrine of Annihilation in the Light of the Gospel of Love (Lon-
don: Henry S. King & Co., 1875), 118-9. 
69  William Hanna, ed., Letters of Th omas Erskine of Linlathen, 3 ed. (Edinburgh: David Douglas, 
1878), 428. 
70  See Hans Urs von Balthasar, Dare We Hope “Th at All Men Be Saved”? With a Short Discourse 
on Hell (Fort Collins: Ignatius Press, 1988). 
71  Carl E. Braaten, Principles of Lutheran Th eology (Augsburg: Fortress, 1983), 84. 
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Christ. Our theological duty is to see and understand it as being still greater 
than we had seen before.”72  
 A Concluding Appreciation 
 Th e criticisms and their implications raised by Gockel will no doubt continue 
to be a point of dispute—a dialectic—among readers of Barth for the foresee-
able future. Th ose with an interest in the more general debate about universal-
ism would be well served by reading Gockel’s ﬁne study. However, those who 
are already convinced that Schleiermacher’s and (early) Barth’s doctrine of 
election remains the most tenable proposal will only ﬁnd further material here 
to bolster their conviction. To those who remain unconvinced, Gockel oﬀers 
little argument here to change one’s mind. 
 Gockel’s work ﬁlls a notable gap in Schleiermacher and Barth studies. While 
there is, encouragingly, something of a renaissance of interest in Schleierma-
cher, Gockel’s contribution to our understanding of, and appreciation for, 
Schleiermacher’s project in general, and his doctrine of election in particular, 
is thus far unsurpassed. Schleiermacher is not an easy read. Not only is his own 
terminology inconsistent, but his grammar and theological geography remain 
largely foreign to contemporary readers. Gockel oﬀers some assistance here. 
Also, his contribution regarding Barth’s early thinking on election serves as a 
most worthy conversation partner with other contributions in the same area.73 
 Th e book is clearly written, avoids stereotypes of Schleiermacher and Barth, 
and includes a useful bibliography and two indexes. While Gockel oﬀers a 
very valuable survey of the thinking of two Protestant giants on a central theme 
not only in their theology, but in the Reformed tradition of which they were 
both heirs—a valuable task in itself—I would have liked to have seen more 
critical engagement with these two voices. It may have also been fruitful, for 
example, to chart how Schleiermacher’s and Barth’s doctrine of election relates 
to the human response to God’s free grace in baptism, for example, as Barth 
was already directing us to in IV/4. 
 Th at said, in what is certainly one of the ﬁnest studies to have appeared 
on Barth in recent years, Gockel models the kind of close dogmatic scrutiny 
that Schleiermacher’s and Barth’s theological contributions both deserve and 
72  Karl Barth, Th e Humanity of God, trans. John Newton Th omas and Th omas Wieser (London: 
Collins, 1961), 62. 
73  For example, Suzanne McDonald, “Barth’s ‘Other’ Doctrine of Election in the Church 
Dogmatics,” International Journal of Systematic Th eology 9, no. 2 (2007), 134-47. 
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demand. Th ose with an interest in systematic theology and the history of doc-
trine, those with an interest in getting their mind around Barth’s much misun-
derstood doctrine of election, those with an interest in exploring a way forward 
for overcoming old rifts between Lutherans and Calvinists, and those with an 
interest in more current debates over universalism will beneﬁt from reading 
Gockel’s book. 
